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Defining The Role Of The Jury In Patent
Litigation: The Court Takes Inventory
I. INTRODUCTION
In a global economy where fast paced technological and scien-
tific developments create stiff competition, patents are valuable
property. The value of a patent to the patentee or the patent
owner hinges on the ability to enforce the right to exclude others
from making, using or selling the patented invention.'
Patent litigation is inherently complex for several reasons.
First, although patent law is statutorily based, with over two
centuries of judicial interpretation the Supreme Court has yet to
address many patent issues. Second, rules of patent claims
drafting and the patent examination process are simply arcane.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, modern inventions are
based on highly complex technology and scientific principles that
were not anticipated by early patent law jurisprudence.
The demand for jury trials in patent cases has increased dra-
matically over the past few decades. Jury verdicts in patent
cases are, however, often unpredictable and inconsistent. Some
believe the reason for such inconsistency is the sheer complexity
of the issues arising in patent litigation, which are often far
beyond the comprehension of the average individual. This skep-
ticism has led many to advocate limiting the jury's role in patent
litigation, or even completely eliminating the jury from such
cases.
The increasing value of patents in our economy dictates a
pressing need for uniformity in the application of patent law.
Restricting the role of the jury to achieve this uniformity, how-
ever, clearly conflicts with the right to a jury trial in civil cases
guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has
recently reviewed three cases that illustrate the need for
delineating the role between the judge and jury in patent litiga-
1. This is the right bestowed by the grant of a patent in exchange for the inven-
tor's disclosure of his invention to the public. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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tion. In In re Lockwood,2 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue
of how the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial applies in
the context of patent validity. In Markman v. Westview Instru-
ments, Inc.,. the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of whether
patent claims construction is a matter of law for the court or a
question of fact for the jury. In Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v.
Warner-Jenkinson Co.,4 the court determined whether infringe-
ment under the doctrine of equivalents is a matter to be decided
by the jury as a legal issue or the court as an equitable one. The
United States Supreme Court granted petitions for certiorari in
all three cases.
Part II of this comment provides a brief overview of patent law
jurisprudence. Part II also discusses the Seventh Amendment
right to a civil trial by jury and the application of the "historical
test" and so-called "complexity exception" as they relate to this
issue. Part III of this comment discusses each of the Federal Cir-
cuit decisions cited above as well as the Supreme Court decision
in Markman, and part IV analyzes how the Markman decision is
likely to affect the issues addressed by the Federal Circuit in the
other two cases. Finally, part V concludes that given the impor-
tance of the constitutional mandate of civil trial by jury, the
Court is not attempting to eliminate or restrict jury trials in pat-
ent litigation, but rather to define and clarify the respective roles




The United States Constitution empowers Congress to estab-
lish laws governing the grant of patents by the following provi-
sion: "The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . ."' Current statutory
patent law allows the grant of a patent for "any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof .... ,,6 In addition to the
requirement that the invention or discovery be useful, the stat-
2. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
3. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
4. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (1996).
5. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
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ute requires that the invention be novel7 and nonobvious "to a
person having ordinary skill" in the relevant art.8
Modern patents are required to set forth a written description
of the invention in "such full, clear, concise, and exact terms" as
to enable any person skilled in the relevant art to make and use
the invention. 9 This written description is defined as the "specifi-
cation."10 The specification must disclose the preferred embodi-
ment or "best mode" of making or carrying out the invention
contemplated by the inventor at the time of application.'1 The
law mandates that the specification "conclude with one or more
claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the sub-
ject matter" that is regarded as the invention. 2 The claims, as
distinguished from the rest of the specification, define the "metes
and bounds"1 3 of the invention.
14
ii. Infringement
The current United States patent statute provides: "[W]hoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells any patented
invention, within the United States during the term of the patent
7. Id. § 102. The statute provides, in pertinent part:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known
or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication
in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for pat-
ent, or (b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States ....
Id.
8. Id. § 103. The statute sets forth, in relevant part:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically dis-
closed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains ....
Id.
9. Id. § 112.
10. Id.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
12. Id. There was no specific requirement for claims in the United States patent
statute until the Act of 1836. 1 A. DELLER, PATENT CLAIMS § 3 (2d ed. 1971) (citing Patent
Act of 1836, § 6). It appears that the provision in the Act requiring claims was inserted in
the law for the purpose of relieving courts from the duty of ascertaining the exact inven-
tion and comparing the claimed invention with the prior art. Id. § 4 (citing Keystone
Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S. 274 (1877)). This task was cast upon the Patent
Office examiner, with whom it remains today. Id.
13. "Metes and bounds" is a term used in property law describing the measurement
and determination of the precise boundaries of a parcel of land. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
991 (6th ed. 1990).
14. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(Bennett, J., dissenting in part)(quoting Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Systems, Inc.,
720 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1983). See also 1 A. DELLER, supra note 12 at § 4 n.9, stating. "It
is the office of the claim to reveal to the world what the characteristics of the invention
are for which the patentee desires protection."
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therefore, infringes the patent." 5 When determining if an
accused device literally infringes a valid patent, one must look to
the claims in view of the specification to determine what pre-
cisely is the claimed invention. 16 "If [the] accused matter falls
clearly within the claim, [literal] infringement is made out and
that is the end of it."'
7
Early patent law jurisprudence developed an additional theory
of patent infringement known as the "doctrine of equivalents."'8
The invocation of the doctrine acts to expand the scope of the
patent protection that is defined by the claims.19 More specifi-
cally, even if a patent claim is not literally infringed, it may nev-
ertheless be infringed under the doctrine of equivalents if the
accused device "performs substantially the same function in sub-
stantially the same way to obtain the same result" as the pat-
ented invention.s
A determination of patent infringement is a two-step process.2 '
First, the meaning of the patent claims at issue must be ascer-
tained. Second, the properly construed claims must be compared
to the accused matter to decide whether each limitation in the
properly construed claims is found, either literally or equiva-
lently, in the accused matter.22 Normally, the first step, claims
15. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1988). Congress expanded the definition of infringement to
include offers to sell patented inventions and importation into the United States. This
expanded definition became effective on January 1, 1996. Pub. L. 103-564 § 533(a), 108
Stat. 4809 (Dec. 8, 1994).
16. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
17. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607.
18. The origin of the doctrine of equivalents may be traced back well over a century
to Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853), where the Court stated:
Where form and substance are inseparable, it is enough to look at the form
only. Where they are separable; where the whole substance of the invention may
be copied in a different form, it is the duty of the courts and juries to look through
the form for the substance of the invention - for that which entitled the inventor to
his patent, and which the patent was designed to secure; where that is found, there
is infringement; and it is not a defence, that it is embodied in a form not described,
and in terms claimed by the patentee.
Id. at 343.
19. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir.
1948), in which the court stated:
[A] patent is like any other legal instrument; but it is peculiar in this, that
after all aids to interpretation have been exhausted, and the scope of the claims
has been enlarged as far as the words can be stretched, on proper occasions courts
make them cover more than their meaning will bear.
Id.
20. Kurt L. Glitzenstein, A Normative and Positive Analysis of the Scope of the
Doctrine of Equivalents, 7 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 281, 283 (1994) (citing Sanitary Refrigera-
tor Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)).
21. Morton Intl Inc. v. Cardinal Chemical Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,
762 F.2d 969, 974 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
22. Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 821.
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construction, is a matter of law for the judge; the second step,
infringement determination, is a question of fact for the jury.23
The process of claims construction (a matter of law) may
require courts to look beyond the actual claims and specification
to certain extrinsic evidence such as prosecution or file history,
prior art documents and expert testimony to gain a clear under-
standing of the invention.24 The focus in construing claim lan-
guage is not a subjective test of what the parties to the patent
intended the claims to mean, but rather an objective test of what
one of ordinary skill in the relevant art at the time of the inven-
tion would understand the claims to mean.26
As judges are not often "conversant in the particular technical
language of the art,"26 extrinsic evidence may be necessary to
interpret the claim language. When terms in claim language
are in dispute, judges might find it necessary to make factual
determinations based upon such extrinsic evidence. These fac-
tual determinations are at the heart of much recent controversy.
B. The Seventh Amendment Right to a Trial by Jury
i. History
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that "[iln Suits at common law, where the value in con-
troversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury
shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise
re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of common law."28 The right to a civil jury trial was not
guaranteed by the Constitution when it was adopted in 1789.29
In fact, the delegates to the constitutional convention had consid-
ered but rejected such a provision.30 The absence of the guaran-
tee of a jury trial in civil cases, however, was a source of objection
in many state conventions during ratification of the Constitution.
Therefore, the first Congress included the Seventh Amendment
in the Bill of Rights1.3  Failure to discern the original objectives
23. Winans, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 338. See also Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1384, stat-
ing that "there is no dispute that infringement cases must be tried to a jury .... " Id.
24. Markman, 52 F.3d at 981. A patent file history or file wrapper is the "written
record of preliminary negotiations between an applicant and the Patent Office for a pat-
ent." BLAci's LAw DITIONARY 628 (6th ed. 1990).
25. Markman, 52 F.3d at 981.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
29. Douglas King, Complex Civil Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Right to a





of the proponents of the Seventh Amendment has been a persis-
tent obstacle to understanding the intended meaning of the
Amendment. 2 Efforts to define the scope of the highly valued
right to a civil trial by jury33 have been hampered by the fact that
no record of the contemporary congressional debates concerning
the right exists.34
ii. The "Historical Test"
Justice Story formulated the accepted interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment in his 1812 opinion in United States v.
Wonson .3 He determined that while the Seventh Amendment
does not create an independent right to a jury trial, it maintains
a party's rights equivalent in scope to those that existed at com-
mon law in England in 1791, when the Bill of Rights was rati-
fied.36 This "historical test" is employed to determine such issues
as the respective functions of the judge and jury in a jury trial
and whether a jury need be available at all.3v
In a later case, Justice Story explained that the right to a civil
jury trial is not limited to the precise causes of action available in
the law courts of England.38  In Tull v. United States,39 the
Supreme Court held that the right to a jury trial extends to
causes of action created by Congress that are similar to common
law forms of action.40 Recently, the Court further found that the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial exists in a cause of
action merely analogous to 18th century forms of action, even
though the cause of action was unknown at common law.4'
32. Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional Theory of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973).
33. See THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), providing:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury: or if there
is any difference between them, it consists in this: the former regard it as a valua-
ble safeguard to liberty, the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
government.
Id.
34. King, supra note 29 at 585.
35. 29 F.Cas. 745 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812)(No. 16,750).
36. Wonson, 29 F.Cas. at 750 (stating that "[b]eyond all question, the common law
here alluded to [in the Seventh Amendment] is not the common law of the individual
states (for it is probably different in all), but is the common law of England, the grand
reserve of our jurisprudence").
37. Id.
38. See Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830).
39. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
40. Tull, 481 U.S. at 417 (citing Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)).
41. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-66
(1990) (holding that right to jury trial applied to action for breach of labor union's duty of
fair representation).
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iii. The Complexity Exception
When first articulated, the historical test was readily applica-
ble because 19th century litigation closely resembled that of the
late 18th century when the Bill of Rights was ratified.42 Applica-
tion of the test in recent times has proven more problematic. As
one author commented, a liberalization of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and a proliferation of new causes of action, which
together have created the possibility for civil litigation far
beyond a level of complexity ever imaginable in the common law
courts of 1791, have occurred in the last fifty years." Another
commentator noted: "Asking how 1791 England would deal with
a 1991 multi-district patent infringement case is a little like ask-
ing how the War of Roses would have turned out if both sides had
airplanes.""
Multi-claim/multi-party cases were indeed heard in equity in
1791. 45 Some commentators reason, however, that since complex
cases were not heard at law during that period, the Seventh
Amendment does not preserve a current right to a civil jury trial
in such litigation. 46
In Ross v. Bernhard,47 the Supreme Court dropped the so-
called "Ross footnote," which later prompted some to speculate
about the future of jury trials in complex litigation. After dis-
cussing the distinction between law and equity, the Court stated
within the Ross footnote that "the legal nature of an issue is
determined by considering, first, the pre-merger custom with ref-
erence to such questions; second, the remedy sought; and third,
the practical abilities and limitations of the juries."'
As a result of the Ross footnote, the circuits have split over the
existence of a "complexity exception" to the Seventh Amend-
ment.49 The Ninth Circuit, in In re U.S. Financial Securities Liti-
gation,5" denied that such an exception exists and applied the
42. King, supra note 29 at 581.
43. Id. at 582.
44. Kenneth S. Klein, The Myth of How to Interpret the Seventh Amendment Right
to a Civil Jury Trial, 53 OHIo ST. L. J. 1005, 1028 (1992). Klein noted that for the past
two hundred years, courts have operated under the myth that Seventh Amendment lan-
guage holds a "kernel of a black letter rule of law," but that the black letter rule has no
more substance than "the emperor's clothes." Id. at 1006.
45. Rita Sutton, A More Rational Approach to Complex Civil Litigation in the Fed-
eral Courts: The Special Jury, 1990 U. Cm. L. F. 575 (citing King, supra note 29 at 603-
06).
46. Id.
47. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
48. Ross, 396 U.S. at 538 n.10.
49. See Sutton, supra note 45.
50. 609 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1979).
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literal guarantee of a right to a civil jury trial to that case. 51 In
doing so, the court stated that "it is doubtful that the Supreme
Court would attempt to make such a radical departure from its
prior interpretation of a constitutional provision in a footnote."5 2
The Third Circuit, however, utilizing the rationale of the Ross
footnote, denied a request for a jury trial due to the complexity of
the underlying litigation in In re Japanese Electronic Products
Antitrust Litigation.5 3 The court reasoned that a jury that can-
not understand the proffered evidence and applicable legal prin-
ciples fails to provide the safeguard against erroneous decisions,
which is the primary value of due process in fact finding
procedures.
54
In 1987, the Supreme Court attempted to end the speculation
that the Ross footnote established a complexity exception. In
Tull v. United States,55 the Court noted that an inquiry into the
"practical abilities and limitations of juries" should be made only
when considering the applicability of the Seventh Amendment to
administrative law courts.56 Subsequently, in Granfinanciera,
S.A. v. Nordberg,57 the Court further indicated that the Ross
footnote concerned only the functional capabilities of the jury
mechanism in administrative proceedings and not the abilities of
individual jurors.5 8 This restrictive treatment of the Ross foot-
note clearly indicates that the Court is unlikely to sanction a
complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment. 9
The fact that the jury's role in patent litigation has come under
fire is not surprising given the rather arcane rules of patent
claims drafting,6 ° the increasing complexity of inventions and the
enormous importance of intellectual property in our modern
global economy. Rising costs of litigation and lack of predictabil-
ity of outcome are the primary concerns noted in support of abol-
51. U.S. Financial Securities Litigation, 609 F.2d at 431.
52. Id. at 425.
53. 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980).
54. Japanese Electronic Products, 631 F.2d at 1084 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of
the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)). Notably, the dis-
trict courts have also addressed the possible complexity exception to a jury trial right
with varying results. See Sutton, supra note 45 at n.57.
55. 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
56. Tull, 481 U.S. at 418 n.4. The Court also noted that these considerations have
not been used as a basis to extend the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.
Id.
57. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
58. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 42 n.4.
59. For a more comprehensive history and explanation of the complexity exception,
see REMARKS OF HERBERT'ScHwARTz, Eleventh Federal Circuit Judicial Conference (June
18, 1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 240-44 (1993).
60. See LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIms DRAFTNG (3d ed. 1991).
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ishing jury trials in patent cases. In recent times, parties in
patent cases who are unlikely to prevail appear to nevertheless
"throw the dice" and demand a jury trial.61 Since a high showing
is required for reversal of a jury verdict,62 a favorable verdict is
likely to be insulated from meaningful review.63
Some commentators disagree that a request for a jury trial in
a patent case is a mere "throw of the dice."6' They argue that a
jury trial in a patent case is actually likely to bring about a deci-
sion more quickly because there are fewer trial interruptions and
the jury's presence ensures simplification of highly technical evi-
dence and complex legal rules.6 5 Furthermore, these commenta-
tors note that there is no evidence that judges can render
qualitatively better decisions than juries.66
Proponents of limiting the jury's role in patent litigation argue
that extraordinary demands are placed on juries confronted with
complex scientific and technical evidence and time consuming
patent law issues.67 Moreover, during jury selection, a potential
juror who possesses the level of education and technological
knowledge necessary to comprehend the complexities likely to
arise in a patent trial is more likely to be challenged by one of the
parties.6" Arguably, it is in the best interest of the party with a
technically weak case to rid the panel of any juror likely to com-
prehend the issues with the use of peremptory challenges.69
61. John B. Pegram, Should the U.S. Court of International Trade be Given Patent
Jurisdiction Concurrent with that of the District Courts?, 32 Hous. L. REV. 67, 83
(1995)(quoting REMARKS OF ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFuss, Tenth Federal Circuit Judicial
Conference (April 30, 1992), in 146 F.R.D. 205, 239 (1992)).
62. See Perkin Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir.
1984)(holding that on appeal, jury findings and legal conclusions are presumed to be sup-
ported by substantial evidence). The court defined substantial evidence as "such relevant
evidence from the record taken as a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as
adequate to support the finding under review." Id.
63. Pegram, supra note 61 at 83.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 83 n.98 (citing as an example REMARKs OF ROBERT MAYER, Eleventh Fed-
eral Circuit Judicial Conference (June 18, 1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 252 (1993)).
67. Id. (citing Lemelson v. General Mills, Inc., 968 F.2d 1202 (Fed. Cir.
1992)(reversing jury verdict on grounds that jury had reached inherently inconsistent
conclusions regarding alleged uniqueness of patent in issue); Texas Instruments, Inc. v.
Cypress Semiconductor Corp., No. 3:90-CV-150-H (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 1995)(reversing
jury verdict because jurors had either failed to follow law or were hopelessly confused)).
68. Matsushita Amici Brief at n.6 (citing Stephen I. Friedland, Legal Institutions:
The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 190,
193 (1990)). See also Warren Burger, Is Our Jury System Working?, READER'S DIGEST,
Feb. 1981 at 126, 129 (stating that "[wihen lawyers are allowed in on [the jury selection]
process they often pervert the quest for an impartial jury with questions that seek not so
much to identify bias as to define sympathies and thus obtain a favorable jury").
69. Matsushita Amici Brief at n.6.
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III. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT: RECENT DECISIONS
As previously noted, the Federal Circuit70 has addressed the
role of the jury in patent litigation in three very recent decisions.
The Supreme Court has granted petitions for certiorari in all
three cases.
A. In re Lockwood
In the In re Lockwood decision, v" Lawrence B. Lockwood
("Lockwood") brought a patent infringement action against
American Airlines, Inc.("American") and moved for a jury trial."2
American raised several defenses to the complaint, including the
alleged invalidity of the patents at issue, and counterclaimed for
a declaratory judgment of noninfringement or a judgment that
the patents at issue were invalid.73 American moved for and the
court granted summary judgment on the infringement claim, and
the court then proceeded to consider American's prayer for
declaratory judgment of invalidity.
74
American moved to strike Lockwood's motion for a jury trial,
arguing that because the court had dispensed with the infringe-
ment claim, its prayer for declaratory relief was the only claim
remaining.75 The trial court granted American's motion to strike
on the issue of validity, concluding that since the remaining
claims were equitable in nature, Lockwood was not entitled to a
trial by jury.76
Lockwood petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to rein-
70. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 by the Fed-
eral Courts Improvement Act, which merged the existing Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals with the appellate division of the Court of Claims. Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 122, 127, 96 Stat. 25, 36-39 (1982). As early as 1966,
the Supreme Court noted that there was a "notorious difference" between standards of
patentability applied by the courts and standards applied by the Patent Office. Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966). There also existed a wide range of variability
among the various circuits, which led to forum shopping in patent cases. See S. Rep. No.
275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1981), reported in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15. Consequently,
the Federal Circuit was established to provide uniformity of patent decisions and the
stability of patent law in general. Id. at 5.
71. 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), vacated and remanded, American Airlines, Inc. v.
Lockwood, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
72. See Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1246 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
Lockwood alleged that American's computerized reservation system infringed two pat-
ents relating to self-service terminals and automatic ticket dispensing systems. Id.
73. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968. Lockwood sought both damages and injunctive
relief and made a timely jury demand. Id.
74. Id. The district court had denied Lockwood's motion to certify the summary
judgment decision for immediate appeal. Id.
75. Id. at 969.
76. Id.
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state his jury demand. 7 The Federal Circuit granted Lockwood's
petition, reasoning that since Lockwood's underlying infringe-
ment claim was the basis of his action, his claim for infringement
damages still existed and thus Lockwood was entitled to a jury
trial on the factual issues relating to patent validity.78
American subsequently petitioned the Federal Circuit for
rehearing, which the court granted.79 On rehearing, the Federal
Circuit held that the infringement claim no longer existed and
that the statements in its previous order were erroneous.8 0 The
court continued to disagree, however, with the trial court's rea-
soning that since American's claim for declaratory judgment was
equitable in nature, Lockwood was not entitled to a trial by jury
under the Seventh Amendment.
81
The court concluded that given the grave importance of Lock-
wood's Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, "the right to
grant mandamus to require a jury trial where it has been
improperly denied is [well] settled." 2 The court then evaluated
Lockwood's right to a jury trial on the factual questions relating
to patent validity as they arose in a paradigmatic patent
infringement suit.
83
77. Id. A writ of mandamus "issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is
directed to... an inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act therein
specified . . . or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of
which he has been illegally deprived." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 866 (6th ed. 1990).
78. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 968-69. On rehearing, the court redacted its erroneous
holding that Lockwood's claim for infringement still existed despite the fact that the dis-
trict court had dismissed the claim on summary judgment. Id. at 969.
79. Id. at 968. American presented two arguments in its petition: first, that
because the court below had dismissed Lockwood's infringement claim, the only claim
remaining was American's prayer for a declaration of patent invalidity; and second, that
American's action for a declaratory judgment was purely equitable in nature, therefore
Lockwood was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 969.
80. Id. (citing In re Evangelist, 760 F.2d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1985)(refusing to consider
dismissed claim in determining whether jury demand should be met); Hildebrand v.
Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1979)(suggesting that claim for damages
dismissed on summary judgment should not be considered when determining party's
asserted Seventh Amendment right to jury trial)). The court vacated its March 11, 1994
order. Id. at 969.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 970 (citing Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 472 (1962)(stating
that it is "the responsibility of the Federal Courts of Appeals to grant mandamus where
necessary to protect the constitutional right to trial by jury"); Beacon Theaters, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 511 (1959)(reversing circuit court's refusal to issue writ of man-
damus reinstating petitioner's jury trial demand)). The court quoted Justice Sutherland
in Dimick v. Scheidt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935): "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body
is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that
any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with the utmost
of care." Id. (quoting Dimick, 293 U.S. at 486).
83. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 970-71.
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In reviewing Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, the court
recognized that the Seventh Amendment embraces adjudication
of legal rights created by statute even where those rights have no
precursor at common law.84 The court found that the statutory
test8 5 requires a two-pronged analysis: (1) the court must com-
pare the statutory action to 18th century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of law and equity; and (2)
the court must then examine whether the nature of the remedy
sought is legal or equitable. 86 If a claim involves an adjudication
of legal rights or requires the invocation of legal remedies, the
court "must honor a jury demand to the extent that disputed
issues of fact concerning those rights and remedies require a
trial."8 7
The court noted that the only claim remaining in Lockwood's
case was American's prayer for a declaratory judgment of patent
invalidity.' The Supreme Court has established that for pur-
poses of the Seventh Amendment, declaratory judgment actions
are only as equitable or legal in nature as the controversies upon
which they are founded 9
The Federal Circuit concluded that the underlying controversy
for American's declaratory judgment action of patent invalidity
was no more than a suit for patent infringement brought by
Lockwood, in which the affirmative defense of invalidity had
been pled by American.90 Such an inversion, the court noted,
"cannot operate to frustrate Lockwood's Seventh Amendment
84. Id. at 972 (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987)).
85. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the origin of
the statutory test. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
origin of the historical test for the right to a civil jury trial.
86. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (citing Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No.
391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)).
87. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (quoting Tull, 481 U.S. at 425, and Curtis v. Loether,
415 U.S. 189, 195 (1974)).
88. Id. at 972-73. The court reasoned that the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934
created an action in the federal courts that was unknown at common law. Id. at 973. The
Declaratory Judgment Act provides in pertinent part: "In a case of actual controversy
within its jurisdiction.., any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeing
such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought." 28 U.S.C. § 2201
(1988). The modern English declaratory judgment action did not develop in Chancery
until the late 19th century. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 n.7 (citing EDWIN BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTs 125-31 (2d ed. 1941)). From the passage of the Declaratory
Judgment Act until the merger of law and equity in the federal courts, declaratory judg-
ment actions were heard in both law and equity. Id. at 973.
89. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 973 (citing Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 223 (1962)).
See also FED. R. Civ. P. 57.
90. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974.
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rights."91 The court then reasoned that since this inverted pat-
ent infringement suit could have been raised either at law or at
equity in 18th century England, Lockwood was entitled to have
the factual questions relating to the validity of his patents tried
before a jury.92 Accordingly, the court granted Lockwood's peti-
tion for writ of mandamus directing the district court to reinstate
his jury demand.
9 3
Notably, the dissenting judges offered some compelling argu-
ments against the court's grant of mandamus. They argued
against the Lockwood order respecting the right to trial by jury
on the issue of patent invalidity, or the underlying facts, for three
reasons.94 First, the judges reasoned, the validity of a patent
involves public, not private, rights and Seventh Amendment jury
trials are not available for a determination of public rights. 9
Second, the declaratory judgment of patent invalidity sought by
American in this case could not be the inverse of an infringement
action for damages for several reasons.96 Initially, since the
infringement action had been dismissed, it no longer existed.
The court erroneously granted a jury trial based on the presence
of a "legal right" issue without a claim for damages.97 Moreover,
91. Id. at 975 (citing Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at 504; Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Lake
Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1189 (3d Cir. 1979)(stating, "[i]fthe declaratory judgment
action does not fit into one of the existing equitable patterns, but is essentially an
inverted law suit - an action brought by one who would have been a defendant at common
law - then the parties have a right to a jury")). See 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 20.03
[41[c][vi] at 20-428 n.109 (noting that suit for declaratory judgment of invalidity "is in
substance an infringement suit with the parties initially reversed"); 6A JAMES W. MOORE
ET. AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 57.20 at 57-213 (stating,"[a] declaratory action
brought by the accused infringer is for the purpose of securing a judicial determination of
plaintiffs immunity from the operation of the patent laws - not to assert rights provided
by those laws .... The issues sought to be adjudicated are precisely the same as in an
infringement suit").
92. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976 (citing 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQurTY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 930-934 at 236-39 (photo. reprint 1988)(13th ed. 1886); See 5 MOORE,
supra note 91 § 38.11[5]-[6]).
93. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980.
94. Id. at 981 (Nies, J., dissenting).
95. Id. (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42 n.4 (noting that
Seventh Amendment protects litigant's right to jury trial only if cause of action is legal in
nature and involves matter of private right)). The concept of "public rights" was origi-
nally limited to litigation where the government was a party, but was later expanded to
cases where the government was not a party in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.,
473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985) and Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54. Id. Judge Nies indicated
that the Federal Circuit has held that "the issue of patent validity involves public rights,
not merely private rights." Id. (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604
(Fed. Cir. 1985)). The dissent also argued that Congress has placed patent validity issues
within the cognizance of Article I tribunals as well as Article III tribunals, therefore such
determinations involve public rather than private rights. Id. at 982.
96. Id. at 986.
97. Id. at 986-87.
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the declaratory judgment of invalidity sought by American is not
the "flipside" of an infringement action nor necessarily an affirm-
ative defense, because an affirmative defense is limited to partic-
ular patent claims asserted in a complaint while a counterclaim
may challenge all claims of the patent(s) at issue.98 Even fur-
ther, the "case or controversy" required for a declaratory judg-
ment action is the threat of a suit for infringement by the
patentee against the declaratory plaintiff and thus infringement
in such a case is not an issue.99
The third reason proffered by the dissent against the court's
grant of mandamus was that they considered the issue of patent
validity to be a question of law necessitating resolution of under-
lying facts by the judge to ensure correct legal determination and
uniformity of decisions. 00 According to Judge Nies, the author of
the Lockwood dissent, a judge is more appropriate than a jury to
make the determination of patent validity.10 Judge Nies also
noted that current jury cases are tried in accordance with confus-
ing precedent such that evidence respecting patent validity "is
thrown into the black box of the jury room. "102
Although on June 5, 1995 the United States Supreme Court
granted American's petition for certiorari, 0 3 on September 1,
1995, after the patentee, Lockwood, withdrew his jury demand,
98. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 986.
99. Id. Recently in Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 113 S. Ct.
1967 (1993), the United States Supreme Court held that "a party seeking a declaratory
judgment of invalidity presents a claim independent of the patentee's charge of infringe-
ment." Id. at 1975. See also Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 888 (Fed. Cir.
1992); Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
100. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 987-90 (Nies, J., dissenting)(citing Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)(stating that ultimate question of patent validity is one of law)
(citing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950)).
101. Id. at 989 (Nies, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 988-90 (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1547-48
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that it was not error to give issue of patent validity to jury and
that judge maintained control over issue of law by court's instructions on applicable law
and by ruling on directed verdict and new trial motions)); Sarkinstan v. Winn-Proof
Corp., 688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982)(en banc)(holding that issue of patent validity is matter
of law for court, but that facts must be found by jury); Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
723 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1983)(en banc) (addressing issue of nonobviousness and declaring
issue to be one of law, but holding that underlying factual issues go to jury); Norfin, Inc. v.
International Bus. Machine Corp., 625 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1980) (recognizing issue of
validity to be one of law, but holding that conditions of patentability, e.g., novelty, utility
and nonobviousness are issues of fact for jury).
103. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. American
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 2274 (1995).
712 Vol. 35:699
1997 The Court Takes Inventory 713
the Court vacated the Federal Circuit's decision and remanded
the case to the district court with instructions to proceed.
10 4
B. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,105 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit examined
whether patent claims construction is a question of law to be
decided by the court or one of fact to be decided by the jury.
10 6
The case commenced when Herbert Markman ("Markman")
brought an action against Westview Instruments, Inc. ("West-
view") and Althon Enterprises, Inc. in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for patent
infringement. 1 7 Markman sought to prove before a jury that the
term "inventory" as used in the patent claims of his United
States Reissue Patent No. 33,054 (the "054 patent") could be con-
strued to include "cash" or "invoices" without including "articles
of clothing." 08
At the close of Markman's case in chief,10 9 Westview moved for
a directed verdict (now "judgment as a matter of law"10 ), but the
district court deferred ruling on the motion."' Westview then
presented testimony of only one witness, its president, who
104. In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. American
Airlines, Inc. v. Lockwood, 115 S. Ct. 2274, vacated, 116 S. Ct. 29 (1995).
105. 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995)(en banc), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 40 (1995,) affd,
116 S. Ct. 1384 (1996).
106. Markman, 52 F.3d at 970.
107. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
Markman is the named inventor and owner of United States Reissue Patent No. 33,054,
titled "Inventory Control and Reporting System for Drycleaning Stores." Id. at 1536. The
patent is directed to an inventory control system that purports to solve inventory control
problems that often plague the drycleaning industry. Id. Markman claimed that his
invention would greatly reduce the occurrence of lost items of clothing by incorporating a
data processor, bar-coded article tags, optical detector device and customer receipt and
business record tickets. Id. The inventory system was thereby "capable of monitoring
and reporting the status, location and throughput of inventory" in the drycleaning estab-
lishment. Id. Westview manufactures and sells specialty electronic devices, including
the accused device, and Althon Enterprises, Inc. owns and operates a drycleaning site
that uses Westview's accused device. Id.
108. Markman, 52 F.3d at 974-75. Markman presented testimony of four wit-
nesses: (1) an expert in the field of bar code technology who testified about the manner in
which Westviews accused device operates; (2) a patent lawyer who testified about the
meaning of the claim language and how that claim language related to the accused
device; (3) an accountant who testified as to the number of accused devices sold; and (4)
Markman himself, as the inventor, who testified as to his patent and its claims. Id. at
973.
109. A "case in chief' is "[t]hat part of a trial in which the party with the initial
burden of proof presents his evidence after which he rests." BiAcis LAw DICTIONARY 216
(6th ed. 1990).
110. See FED. R. CIv. P. 50.
111. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
Duquesne Law Review
demonstrated the accused device and testified as to its opera-
tion." 2 At the conclusion of this testimony, the district court
charged the jury on infringement and instructed them to deter-
mine the meaning of the claims "using the relevant patent docu-
ments, including the specification, the drawings and the file
histories.""i The court instructed the jury to compare the '054
patent claims with the Westview device to determine whether
infringement had occurred.1 14 After deliberation, the jury found
that the accused device had indeed infringed Markman's '054
patent.1"5
Upon Westview's deferred motion for judgment as a matter of
law ("JMOL"), the district court ruled that patent claims con-
struction was a matter of law for the court.116 The court held that
the term "inventory" as used in Markman's '054 patent claims
meant "articles of clothing" and that it did not include totals or
dollars. 1 7 Based upon this interpretation, the district court sub-
sequently directed a verdict of noninfringement."8
Markman appealed the district court's grant of JMOL, con-
tending that the question of claims interpretation had been prop-
erly left to the jury. 119 Relying on a prior Federal Circuit opinion,
Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,2' Markman argued that when the
meaning of a claim is in dispute, a factual question arises and
the claim construction is properly left to the jury.'2' Moreover,
he argued, a district court should not be permitted to "re-find the
facts and reinterpret the claims" once submitted to the jury.'22 In
112. Id. at 972. The accused device consisted of two separate instruments which
Westview named the DATAMARK and the DATASCAN. Id. The DATAMARK is a sta-
tionary unit comprised of a keyboard, electronic display, processor and printer used to
record information about the customer, articles to be cleaned and charges entered by the
attendant. Id. The DATAMARK prints a bar-coded ticket containing this information
and stores in memory only the invoice number, date and cash totals. Id. The DATAS-
CAN is a portable instrument comprising a microprocessor and an optical detector for
reading bar-coded tickets or invoices at any location within the drycleaning establish-
ment. Id. at 973. The DATASCAN compared the bar-coded tickets to the inventory list
generated by the DATAMARK, thereby identifying extra or missing invoices. Id. (empha-
sis added).
113. Id. at 973.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
117. Id.
118. Id. For the district court's opinion granting Westview's deferred JMOL, see
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1535 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
119. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973.
120. 762 F.2d 969 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
121. Markman, 52 F.3d at 973-74 (citing Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 974).
122. Id. at 974 (citing Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma Produkt-Und Marketing Gesell-
schaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546, 1550-52 (Fed. Cir. 1991)(stating positively the deference
due to jury's claims construction)).
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particular, Markman argued that the district court should not
have redefined the term "inventory" to only mean "articles of
clothing," as it could mean "cash" or "invoices" as well as "articles
of clothing."
12 3
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
JMOL.124 The court opined that upon review of a JMOL, a court
first has a duty to say what the correct law is and then determine
whether based upon that law the jury's verdict on the factual
issues is supported by substantial evidence.
125
As to the issue of whether patent claims construction is a legal
or factual matter, the appellate court conceded that some of its
prior decisions were inconsistent. 26 The court stated, however,
that at its inception, the Federal Circuit held in SSIH Equip-
ment, S.A. v. United States International Trade Commission 27
that claims construction is a matter of law. 28 With this state-
ment, the court repudiated a body of intervening decisions adopt-
ing a contrary view. 129 Further, the court opined that a court may
123. Id. Westview focused its argument on the meaning of the term "inventory"
exclusively on the '054 patent and prosecution history. Id. Westview specifically con-
tended that the testimony and other evidence presented by Markman were in conflict
with the patent and prosecution history as to this term, and, therefore, Markman's evi-
dence should be disregarded by the court. Id. Westview asserted that claims construc-
tion is a legal matter exclusively for the court, subject to de novo review. Id.
124. Id. at 989.
125. Id. at 975 (citing Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
126. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
127. 718 F.2d 365 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
128. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 (citing SSIH, 718 F.2d at 688 (resting on authority of
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.(15 How.) 330 (1853)). Accord SRI International v. Matsu-
shita Electric Corp. of America, 775 F.2d 1107, 1118-22 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(en banc); Kalman
v. Kinberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 770-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983); and Fromson v. Advance
Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1569-71 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Markman, 52 F.3d at 976.
129. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976-77. The McGill court had misconstrued an earlier
Federal Circuit case, Envirotech Corp. v. Al George, Inc., 730 F.2d 753 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
and therefore the court reasoned that McGill was not valid precedent. Id. at 976. In
McGill, the plaintiff brought an action alleging infringement of its process patent, and at
issue was the meaning of a patent claim. McGill, 736 F.2d at 671. The jury returned a
verdict of infringement and the court entered judgment for the patentee-plaintiff after
denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. The court of appeals
noted that if the language of the claims is undisputed, the trial court may construe the
claims as a matter of law. Id. at 671-72 (citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. Cramer, 192 U.S. 265,
275 (1904)). Then, citing Envirotech, the court concluded that if the "meaning of a term of
art in the claims is disputed and extrinsic evidence is needed to explain the meaning,
construction of the claims could be left to the jury." McGill, 736 F.2d at 672 (citing
Envirotech, 730 F.2d at 758). The Markman court, however, indicated that Envirotech is
actually consistent with the earlier precedent, as the Envirotech court states, "[tihe pat-
ented invention as indicated by the language of the claims must first be defined (a ques-
tion of law) and then the trier must judge whether the claims cover the accused device (a
question of fact)." Markman, 52 F.3d at 976 (quoting Envirotech, 730 F.2d at
758)(emphasis added). The court noted that although a significant line of Federal Circuit
cases had developed based upon the precedent set by McGill (and its erroneous interpre-
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use such extrinsic evidence as it finds helpful in understanding
the language used in the patent and prosecution history
13 0
The Federal Circuit likened patent claim construction to statu-
tory interpretation, which is a matter of law for the court.131
Since a patent is a fully integrated written document with a
required content specified by statute, it is uniquely suited to
have its meaning and scope determined by the court.132 In con-
clusion, the court determined that three sources must be
examined during the claim construction process: (1) the claims;
(2) the specification; and (3) the prosecution history. 133 The court
then found that since the district court had included all three of
the above mentioned sources in addition to extrinsic evidence in
construing the claims in the '054 patent, its interpretation of the
term "inventory" was correct.
3 4
In a concurring opinion, Judge Mayer criticized the majority
decision as "eviscerat[ing] the role of the jury preserved by the
Seventh Amendment .... 13 5 Judge Mayer reasoned that a deci-
sion as to what the claims mean usually decides the case.' 36
Referring to Judge Nies' dissent in In re Lockwood, Judge Mayer
intimated that the majority decision in Markman was in line
with the "broader bid afoot to essentially banish juries from pat-
ent cases altogether.
" 137
Although Judge Mayer agreed with the majority that claims
construction has always been a matter of law for the court, he
stressed that the underlying factual issues should be left to the
tation of Envirotech), the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that patent claim construc-
tion is a matter of law within the exclusive province of the court. Id. at 977 (citing Coupe
v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 579-80 (1895); Keystone Bridge Co. v. Phoenix Iron Co., 95 U.S.
274, 275 (1877); Winans v. New York & Erie R.R. Co., 62 U.S.(21 How.) 88, 100 (1859);
Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.(15 How.) 330, 338 (1853); Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S.(14 How.)
218, 225 (1853); and Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S.(6 How.) 437, 484 (1848)).
130. Markman, 52 F.3d at 981.
131. Id. at 987.
132. Id. at 978. The statute requires that a patentee include claims "particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention." Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988)).
133. Id. at 979. The court noted that the specification may be considered a diction-
ary of sorts to explain the invention and define the terms where the inventor is free to
assign special meanings to words so long as the inventor clearly defined those words in
the specification. Id. at 979-80.
134. Id. at 979. The court agreed that "inventory" in claim 1 of the Markman patent
includes within its meaning "articles of clothing." Id. at 988-89. As Westview's accused
device cannot track articles of clothing, there was no evidence supporting the jury's ver-
dict of infringement. Id. at 989.
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jury. 3 ' Judge Mayer reasoned that a judge's decision as to the
factual issues underlying claims construction "flies in the face" of
the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
139
The most comprehensive criticism of the majority opinion in
Markman came from Judge Pauline Newman's dissent. Judge
Newman first argued that even if claim construction is ulti-
mately a matter of law, there are significant underlying factual
issues that must be decided by a jury. "0 While the majority did
recognize the relevance of extrinsic evidence in the patent claims
construction process, Judge Newman noted that its holding con-
firmed that juries may not weigh this evidence. 14 1 In particular,
noted Judge Newman, the majority decision dictates that when
the court's claim construction is appealed, the Federal Circuit
must itself weigh the evidence on de novo review.142 Judge New-
man stated, "[i]n resolving litigation controversy by determining
mechanical or chemical or electronic truth, it is hard to under-
stand why justice should be handicapped in the Federal Circuit
by replacement of a live trial with cold documents."1
43
The most scholarly and extensive portion of Judge Newman's
dissent addressed the majority opinion's effect upon the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.14 Examining the origins of pat-
ent law and litigation in England, Judge Newman stressed that
patent cases were always tried in courts of law before a jury
unless the patentee sought only equitable relief. 45 It was this
right to a jury trial, Judge Newman opined, which was guaran-
teed by the Seventh Amendment. 1
46
Upon the United States Supreme Court's grant of certiorari to
the Markman case, the Court determined that the interpretation
of a patent claim is indeed a matter of law reserved for the court
rather than a matter subject to the Seventh Amendment guaran-
tee of a jury trial whereby the jury must determine the meaning
of a disputed term of art about which expert testimony is prof-
138. Id. Judge Mayer stated that since the issue of patent scope depends on the
legal effect of the language of the claims, it is a legal matter, however, it does not neces-
sarily follow that the judge is to decide every question arising during the claims construc-
tion process. Id.
139. Id. at 992 (citing Chauffeurs, 494 U.S. at 564).
140. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1004 (Newman, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 1001.
142. Id. at 1006. The dissent posed the question of what procedure the court would
use if it was to find complex and technological facts for itself, and how was correctness to
be achieved during the appellate process of "page-limited briefs and fifteen minutes per
side of argument?" Id. at 1021 n.11.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1010.
145. Markman, 52 F.3d at 1010-14.
146. Id. at 1015-16.
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fered. 147 Consistent with the historical test, the Court compared
the statutory action to 18th century actions of the courts in Eng-
land prior to merger. The Court concluded that "there is no dis-
pute" that modern infringement actions must be tried to a jury as
were their predecessors more than two centuries ago.' 48
Looking to existing precedent, the Court noted that there are
two elements to a patent infringement determination: (1) con-
struing the claims; and (2) determining whether those claims are
infringed by the accused device. 149 The Court then held that the
former is a question for the judge and the latter is a question for
the jury. 50 This conclusion, it noted, was one that the Court had
repeatedly supported in its prior decisions and one that was
understood by commentators.' 5' The Court also reasoned that
functional considerations play a part in the choice between judge
and jury to interpret terms of art within a patent, and because
"construction of written instruments is one of those things that
judges often do and are likely to do better than juries," judges
and not juries are better suited to ascertain the meaning of pat-
ent terms. 52 Markman had argued that since questions as to the
meaning of a term of art are the subject of testimony, credibility
determinations must be made by the jury. 53 The Court refuted
this argument, however, on the basis that it is unlikely that a
case would arise in which a simple credibility judgment "would
147. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 1384, 1387 (1996).
148. Id. at 1389-90 (citing Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 42);
Braman v. Hardcastle, 1 Carp. P.C. 168 (K.B. 1789)). The Court found, however, no clear
guidance in common law practice for dealing with such a "mongrel practice" as construing
a patent claim with the aid of evidence. Id. at 1389. The closest 18th century analogue to
claim construction, the Court found, was the construction of patent specifications. Id. at
1391. There was no support from case law of that period to uphold the argument, by
analogy, that modern claim construction should be left for the jury. Id. at 1390-91.
149. Id. at 1393. The Court quoted the opinion of Justice Curtis, the former patent
practitioner, in Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S.(15 How.) at 338, where Justice Curtis
stated, "[tihe first is a question of law to be determined by the court, construing the let-
ters-patent, and the description of the invention and specification of claim annexed to
them. The second is a question of fact [infringement] to be submitted to the jury." Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1394-95 (citing Coupe, 155 U.S. at 579-80; Silsby v. Foote, 55 U.S.(14
How.) 218, 226 (1853); Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S.(6 How.) 437, 484 (1848); A. WALKER,
PATENT LAws 75 at 68 (3d ed. 1895); and 2 W. ROBINSON, LAw OF PATENTS 732 at 481-83
(1890)).
152. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S, 104, 114
(1985)(holding that when an issue "falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard
and a simple historical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determina-
tion that, as a matter of sound administrative justice, one judicial actor is in a better
position than the other to decide the question.")).
153. Id. at 1395.
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suffice to choose between experts whose testimony was equally
consistent with a patent's internal logic." 154
Finally, the Court held that because the limits of what is
claimed by the patentee must be known to others for the protec-
tion of the patentee, it is in the best interest of uniformity that
patent claim construction be given to the court. 5 5 After all, the
Court noted, it was for the sake of such uniformity that Congress
created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as the exclu-
sive appellate court for patent cases. 156 Accordingly, the Court in
Markman held that the interpretation of the word "inventory" in
the Markman patent claim was an issue for the judge, not the
jury. 157
C. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co.
In July of 1993, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
announced that it would rehear en banc an appeal from Hilton
Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co. 158 to consider three
issues involving patent infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. 5 9 Parties in the case were then asked to brief three
questions: (1) does a finding of infringement under the doctrine
of equivalents require anything in addition to the proof of facts
that there is the same or substantially the same function, way
and result; (2) is the issue of infringement under the doctrine an
equitable determination for the court or an issue of fact for the
jury; and (3) is the application of the doctrine by the trial court in
154. Id. The Court reasoned that credibility judgments will likely be subsumed
within the analysis of the document as a whole since a term may be defined only in a way
that comports with the document as a whole. Id.
155. Id. at 1395-96.
156. Id. at 1396 (citing H.R. REP. No. 97-312 at 20-23 (198lXobserving that uni-
formity would "strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to foster
technological growth and industrial innovation.")).
157. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1396.
158. 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (U.S. Feb. 26,
1996).
159. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the doctrine of equivalents. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. ("Hilton Davis")
sued Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. ("Warner-Jenkinson") for infringement of United States
Patent No. 4,560,746 ("the '746 patent") under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 1515.
The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict of infringement and the Federal Cir-
cuit affirmed. Id. The '746 patent claimed an improved process for purification of Red
Dye #40 and Yellow Dye #6 utilizing ultrafiltration through a membrane filter. Id.
Warner-Jenkinson had independently developed the accused ultrafiltration process for
Red Dye #40 and Yellow Dye #6. Id. Warner-Jenkinson did not learn of the '746 patent
until October of 1986, after it had begun commercial use of the accused process to purify
Red Dye #40. Id. at 1516. Hilton Davis became aware of the Warner-Jenkinson process
in 1989 and sued for infringement in 1991. Id.
Duquesne Law Review
order to find infringement discretionary in accordance with the
circumstances of the case?
160
The Federal Circuit determined that beyond the tripartite
function/way/result test, a finding of infringement under the doc-
trine of equivalents requires proof of "insubstantial differences"
between the claimed and accused products or processes. 161
Although the function/way/result test will often suffice to show
the extent of these differences, the court concluded that other fac-
tors may also be considered, such as evidence relating to copying
or "designing around" a claimed product or process.
1 62
As to the second question posed to the parties, the court clearly
enunciated that infringement, whether literal or under the doc-
trine of equivalents, is an issue of fact to be submitted to the jury
in a jury trial.163 The court noted that the Supreme Court in
Graver Tank made it abundantly clear that infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact. 164 When tried to
the court, an appellate court reviews the trial court's finding of
infringement for clear error; when tried to a jury, an appellate
court reviews the jury verdict for lack of substantial evidence.165
Although the Federal Circuit in several opinions has referred
to the doctrine of equivalents as "equitable," the court explained
that such allusions invoked equity in its broadest sense - equity
as general fairness. 166 The court noted that in Graver Tank, the
Supreme Court explained that the doctrine prevents "the unfair-
ness of depriving the patent owner of effective protection of its
invention," thereby achieving a fair or "equitable" result.'6 7
While recognizing this equity or fairness aspect, however, the
Supreme Court clearly stated that the question of infringement
160. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1516.
161. Id. at 1521.
162. Id. at 1522 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609). The court noted that the test
for "insubstantial differences" is an objective one measured from the vantage point of one
of ordinary skill in the relevant art. Id. at 1519. The court concluded that from evidence
of copying, the fact-finder may infer that the copyist made a fair copy of the claimed prod-
uct or process with only insubstantial differences. Id. The court determined that evi-
dence of "designing around" a patent weighs against a finding of infringement because
the fact-finder may infer from such evidence that the competitor has made substantial
changes to avoid infringement. Id. at 1520.
163. Id. at 1522 (citing Winans, 56 U.S.(15 How.) at 338). This decision took many
by surprise in light of the Markman decision. It appears that now, after the court inter-
prets the scope of the patent claims, the issue of infringement is an issue of fact solely for
the jury.
164. Id. at 1520 (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609-10).
165. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520 (citing Genetech, Inc. v. Wellcome Foundation
Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994)). See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the substantial evidence test.
166. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
167. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607).
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under the doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact, and the Fed-
eral Circuit has followed this analysis. 16  The Federal Circuit
reasoned that since the Supreme Court in Graver Tank credited
the origin of the doctrine of equivalents to its own decision in
Winans v. Denmead, a case at law and not in equity, the doctrine
has a legal basis for recovery and not an equitable one.
169
The court then determined that the answer to the third ques-
tion posed to the parties in this case flowed from the court's
answer to the second question. In particular, the Supreme Court
cases involving the doctrine of equivalents, which is a doctrine of
fairness with its origins in a case at law, foreclose a holding that
the doctrine is a matter of equity to be applied at the court's dis-
cretion. 70 Therefore, the court held that a trial judge does not
have discretion to choose whether to apply the doctrine of
equivalents when the record shows no literal infringement. 71
IV. ANALYsIs
The fact that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to
three cases relating to the role of a jury in patent litigation sends
a clear message that the Court considers the issue to be one of
utmost importance and in dire need of resolution. 72 Given the
recent controversy surrounding jury trials in complex litigation,
and more specifically in patent trials, some would say that the
courts are attempting to limit or even eliminate juries altogether
from such trials.
173
Contrary to this belief, however, the Supreme Court's holding
in Markman illustrates that the Court is giving much needed
definition to the role of a jury in patent trials. Modern patent
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1522.
171. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521. The Supreme Court granted Warner-Jenkin-
son's petition for certiorari on February 26, 1996. Hilton Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-
Jekinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 1014 (U.S. Feb. 22,
1996). The Court's decision is anxiously awaited by patent practitioners.
172. Of the 1,534 petitions for certiorari before the Court when its term began in
October of 1995, only nine cases were chosen for review, leading commentators to believe
that the Justices would issue written opinions in approximately only seventy-five cases.
David G. Savage, Docket Reflects Ideological Shifts, ABA JouRNAL, Dec. 1995 at 40. Dur-
ing the 1980's, the Court granted roughly three percent of petitions filed; now the rate is
less than one percent. Id. (citing Quiet Times, ABA JOURNAL, Oct. 1994 at 40).
173. See Judge Mayer's concurring opinion and Judge Newman's dissent in
Markman, 52 F.3d at 989. See also REMARKS OF ROBERT MAYER, Eleventh Federal Circuit
Judicial Conference (June 18, 1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 250 (1993).
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litigation has indeed seen an incredible increase in requests for
jury trials, thus bringing these issues to the forefront.
174
The Federal Circuit, which is the exclusive appellate forum for
patent litigation, has itself wrought much of the confusion in this
area. In In re Lockwood, the court's March 11, 1994 order grant-
ing mandamus held that since Lockwood's underlying claim for
infringement damages was the basis of the declaratory judgment
action sought by American, the claim for infringement damages
still existed in the case. 175 Although the Federal Circuit redacted
this erroneous holding on rehearing, it nevertheless reinstated
Lockwood's request for a jury trial on questionable grounds.
7 6
If, as the Federal Circuit conceded, Lockwood's claim for
infringement existed no more, then his claim for infringement
damages no longer existed. Without a claim for damages, there
was no legal remedy sought. The dissent was thus correct in
asserting that the only claim remaining, that of American for a
declaration of patent invalidity, was equitable in nature. There-
fore, the district court properly denied Lockwood's demand for a
jury trial.
In Markman, the Federal Circuit conceded that an entire line
of cases regarding jury resolution of the underlying factual issues
of patent claim construction had relied upon its erroneous deci-
sion in McGill.1 77 The court then used Markman as an opportu-
nity to set forth the correct law, relying on its own precedent
prior to McGill as well as relevant Supreme Court precedent.
In Hilton Davis, the Federal Circuit clarified what it meant by
the term "equitable" in the context of the doctrine of equivalents.
Although the court had referred to the doctrine as "equitable" in
previous decisions, it explained that such allusions invoked
equity in the sense of general fairness.7 7 Thus, infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents remains a question of fact for
the jury.
179
Although In re Lockwood, Markman and Hilton Davis all deal
with distinct issues, together they represent a judicial attempt to
define the role of the jury in patent cases while preserving the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The recent Supreme
174. See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980-81 (Nies, J., dissenting)(citing Blonder-Tongue
Lab v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 336 n.30 (1971)). Between 1968 and 1970,
only 13 of 382 patent cases were jury trials; now more than half are tried to juries. See id.
at 980-81 & n.1.
175. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 969.
176. Id. at 986 (Nies, J., dissenting).
177. Markman, 52 F.3d at 976-77.
178. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1521.
179. Id. at 1522.
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Court decision in Markman, however, holding that the judge and
not the jury is to interpret patent claims, willno doubt affect the
issues raised in the other two cases.
Finding little support in patent jurisprudence history, the
Supreme Court in Markman relied on its own precedent and
functional concerns when holding that patent claims construc-
tion is a question for the court. 8 0 The Court itself, in U.S. Indus-
trial Chemicals, Inc. v. Carbide & Carbon Chemicals Corp., I'
stated that "it is permissible, and often necessary, to receive
expert evidence to ascertain the meaning of a technical or scien-
tific term or term of art so that the court may be aided in under-
standing... what [documents] actually say."'" 2 Such extrinsic
evidence, the Court noted, should be used for a court's interpreta-
tion of a patent, not to contradict the claims.'
Although the Court granted American's petition for certiorari
in In re Lockwood, it vacated this grant once Lockwood withdrew
his demand for a jury trial."M Therefore, the Court unfortunately
has yet to address the issue of whether the underlying factual
disputes relevant to patent validity are subject to the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.
In Graham-v. John Deere Co., 18 5 the Court declared that the
issue of patent validity is a matter of law.'8 6 There appears to be
no clear precedent, however, as to which entity-the judge or the
jury-is to decide the underlying factual disputes relevant to
patent validity. 8 7 This lack of precedent appears to be some-
what analogous to the circumstances surrounding the issue con-
fronting the Court in Markman.
When the Court finally addresses this issue, it may apply the
same rationale as it did in Markman. The factual issues under-
lying patent validity involve the statutory requirements for pat-
entability; that is, novelty, utility and nonobviousness. Given
that the Graham Court has already determined patent validity
to be a matter of law, the Court may, in the interest of uniformity
and functional considerations, conclude that the judge and not
the jury is better suited to decide these underlying factual issues.
These factual issues, however, are much broader in scope than
are those underlying the interpretation of a term of art in a pat-
180. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1395.
181. 315 U.S. 668 (1942).
182. U.S. Indus. Chems., 315 U.S. at 678.
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 104, 105.
185. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
186. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
187. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 987 (Nies, J., dissenting).
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ent claim. Unlike claims construction, where the ultimate
infringement issue remains for the jury, if the court reserves for
itself the entire resolution of the validity/invalidity issue, includ-
ing the disputed underlying factual issues, 8 8 the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial could be compromised.
As the Court in Markman clearly enunciated, "there is no dis-
pute that infringement cases today must be tried to a jury, as
their predecessors were more than two centuries ago."18 9 It is
likely then that the Court will affirm the Federal Circuit's deci-
sion in Hilton Davis and thus hold that infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents is an issue of fact for the jury.190
The "equitable" nature of the doctrine to which Federal Circuit
previously alluded was equity in the sense of fairness. The
Supreme Court has already held in Graver Tank that the ques-
tion of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents was one of
fact for the jury, and it is likely to defer to that precedent.
The task remains for the Court, however, to clarify just how a
motion for summary judgment for noninfringement would be
handled as to a claim for infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents once claim interpretation has been accomplished by
the Court under Markman. A Markman claim interpretation
that precludes a finding of literal infringement would support the
grant of a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. 191
A holding by the Court that infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents is a jury question would seem to preclude the grant




Patents encourage technological innovation and promote
industrial growth by granting to the patentee the exclusive right
to exclude competitors from making, using or selling the claimed
188. Such factual issues might include a determination of whether the claimed
invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country
or in use or on sale in the United States more than one year before the United States
patent application was filed. See supra note 7 for the pertinent text of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
(1988). Factual issues underlying a claim of patent invalidity may also arise, inter alia, if
the unobviousness of an invention is challenged under 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988), or if true
inventorship is challenged under 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1988). As a statutory presumption of
patent validity exists, the burden of establishing invalidity rests upon the party asserting
the defense. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1988).
189. Markman, 116 S. Ct. at 1389.
190. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520.
191. Henry Bunsow & Michelle K. Lee, Patent Roles for Judges and Juries, Ameri-
can Lawyer Media, ThE RECORDER, Sept. 20, 1995 at 6.
192. Id.
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invention. In a competitive and highly technical global economy,
patents are clearly valuable property. The value of a patent is
limited by the ability of the patentee or the patent owner to
enforce the patent. Therefore, uniformity in patent law and its
application is an absolute necessity.
As demands for jury trials in patent cases have recently
increased, it has come to the Supreme Court's attention that
many issues relating to the role of the jury in patent litigation
remain unresolved. When is the right to a trial by jury guaran-
teed by the Seventh Amendment in the context of patent litiga-
tion? What specific issues are exclusively for the court as
questions of law and are reserved for the jury as questions of
fact?
Recognizing the need for swift resolution, the Court has begun
to define, not restrict or eliminate, the role of the jury in patent
cases. As civil jury trials are guaranteed by the Seventh Amend-
ment, juries are certainly here to stay in patent and other com-
plex litigation. Markman and the decision from Hilton Davis
will delineate, however, the proper role of the jury in these cases.
Hopefully, with the lower courts on the right track, patent juris-
prudence will develop more uniformly and predictably.
Deborah M. Altman
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